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“For all the profound differences between nineteenth-century philosophy and philosophical thought today, there are some common themes that link them. One of those is the sense that the metaphysical phase of philosophy has come to an end and that we are living at the end of a grand era, or perhaps even after its end.”​[1]​ 

These words, with which Jan Patočka opens his ‘Negative Platonism’, are still valid and relevant today. Patočka notes that there are several reactions on the so-called end of metaphysics, several views that accuse each other of being metaphysical, “…as if that were a deadly weapon.”​[2]​ I would like to demonstrate in this article that more than half a century later this situation has not really changed, and that Patočka’s contribution to the discussion on the end of metaphysics has lost nothing of its relevance. Still today, no one seems quite to know, what the metaphysics that has died, exactly is or was, “…because the question has yet to be posed adequately.”​[3]​ 
	From several currents of thought in late twentieth century continental philosophy that can be discerned with regard to their relation with the metaphysical tradition, I pick out two, that have been, in my opinion, the most influential in the past decades.​[4]​ On one side Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida, on the other side Gadamer and Habermas. Both groups blame each other for being metaphysical, but can be said to be metaphysical themselves at the same time. Patočka’s Negative Platonism will be discussed as a fruitful position in this debate. Special attention will be given to the relation of this notion to the work of Derrida, which is very close to the thought of Patočka, but has some important differences as well.


1. The many deaths of metaphysics

To start with, there is a tradition of outbidding in criticizing metaphysics: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida all try to take a step further in their denouncement of metaphysical thought, claiming that all the preceding criticisms of metaphysics are in themselves still too metaphysical. The unification of reality in one principle or center is taken here as the heart of the metaphysical way of thinking. Each in their own way these critiques are looking for a difference that cannot be mastered or reconciled by any unifying thought.

Nietzsche
	An important pinnacle in metaphysical criticism can be found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Behind the metaphysical project of understanding the whole of reality he discerns several forces. One of them is the force of language that creates unity and order out of a chaos of perceptions and impressions. Language suggests a world of general truths or ideas behind the everyday perceptions.​[5]​ In the same way it suggests that behind everything that happens, there must be a cause, that behind every action there must be a coherent subject with an identity and a free will, and that behind the whole world there has to be a single cause: god. All these illusions can be explained out of the fixating characteristics of language.​[6]​
	Against this metaphysical tendency to lay down the endless change and becoming, the chaos of competing drives and powers, into one essence, Nietzsche proposes a historical approach, a genealogy that aims at a historical explanation and refutation of metaphysics, ethics and religion.​[7]​ This genealogy also explains how metaphysics digs its own grave: the will to truth, another power that is inextricably bound up with metaphysics, will inevitably counter the truth claims of religion and of metaphysics itself.​[8]​ The result of this development is what Nietzsche calls the death of God: the loss of all stable and founded orientation and meaning.​[9]​
	The metaphysics that is denounced here by Nietzsche is the effort to find a determined rational structure within or behind reality, on the basis of which the totality of reality could be understood.

Heidegger
Despite his hostile attitude towards metaphysics, Nietzsche is taken by Martin Heidegger as the last and highest fulfilment, the summit and the end of the metaphysical tradition. For the later Heidegger ‘metaphysics’ means the view of reality as a collection of present beings, an idea of reality that has forgotten of Being and can only be in search of the essentials of beings. As a result, philosophy has taken the shape of ‘onto-theology’: the study of the main qualities of beings (ontology) and of their ultimate cause or source, that could only be thought of as a highest being (theology).​[10]​ 
	The whole history of philosophy, according to Heidegger, is dominated by this way of thinking. From Plato on metaphysics rules, in search of the principles that present reality: principles like the Ideas, the unmoved Mover, God, Cogito, Subject, Spirit, History, and so on. This history of metaphysics reaches its final stages in both technology that makes everything calculable and controllable – and in Nietzsche. In his much discussed interpretation of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician, Heidegger takes the will to power and the eternal return of the same as metaphysical principles. Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is thus interpreted as the summit and the end of metaphysics, as a reversal of Platonism – if you like, as a negative Platonism.​[11]​ 
	In Heidegger’s project of the ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics, the history of metaphysics has to be recaptured and resumed again, in order to think what has yet remained unthought-of, to take a step back to the ground upon which metaphysics has become possible. This long detour through the history of philosophy is the only way towards a new beginning of philosophy that must be a new ‘thinking of Being’.​[12]​ 

Levinas
A further step in this history of critique of metaphysics has been taken by Emmanuel Levinas. Like Heidegger, he opposes against the mainstream history of western philosophy – this time including Heidegger. According to Levinas, philosophical thought has almost always reduced alterity and singularity to ‘the Same’, gathering all that is singular under a general concept, lumping together differences under one denominator (e.g. Ideas, God, History, Reason, or, in the case of Heidegger: Being). Instead, Levinas proposes to develop a philosophy that relates to otherness, or, even better: to the other who withdraws from any thought or grasp, but nevertheless needs to be taken into account.​[13]​ 

Derrida
And then Jacques Derrida, in his turn, has tried to unveil elements of metaphysical thought in Heidegger and Levinas. In doing so, he gives a new and aporetic turn to this history of the ends of metaphysics, bringing it to an end by showing that there can be no end of metaphysics.
	Following Heidegger, Derrida speaks of a ‘metaphysics of presence’, a mode of thought that is looking for a final foundation, source or center of reality that presents itself as self-evident and that makes possible the presence of all other beings. On the basis of this foundation reality is presented as rationally ordered by way of clear distinctions and hierarchical oppositions (transcendent-immanent, inside-outside, etc.). The many figures and shapes that metaphysicians have built through the ages, are all, according to Derrida, linguistic and historical constructions. They need to be dismantled, in order to show their preconditions and shortcomings, as well as the epistemological, ethical, political and other implications inherent in them.​[14]​ Such a dismantling or deconstruction of these constructions is undertaken by use of their inscription in social and linguistic networks of references that are, by their very nature, instable. 
	On the one hand, Derrida problematizes the metaphysical way of thinking as a violent interpretation of reality that always reduces singularities and differences to a unity and thereby excludes other possible interpretations. On the other hand, since this is the case with every interpretation, Derrida emphasizes that there is no alternative; we cannot but understand the world in which we live through a metaphysical manner of thinking.​[15]​
	Our interpretation of the world always implies concepts that are part of a metaphysical construction that must be deconstructed. Metaphysics can impossibly be ended, but we have to be aware of its violent character. Moreover, every effort to leave metaphysics behind is, according to Derrida, in itself a metaphysical movement, because it attempts to make a clear distinction between the metaphysical tradition on the one hand and a new mode of thought beyond metaphysics on the other hand.​[16]​ In fact Derrida proclaims the end of the tradition of outbidding in proclaiming the end of metaphysics. 
	The history of philosophy consists of a large number of metaphysical constructions that have to be criticized and replaced again and again. Metaphysics, therefore, is an infinite and immortal striving for absolute knowledge that can only result in finite constructions.​[17]​ Already in one of his first publications Derrida describes philosophy as a ‘community of the question’, which he later translates as a ‘community of the call’: a community of thinkers that have to respond to the questions they find themselves confronted with. Derrida’s deconstructions aim to preserve these questions as questions.​[18]​ Deconstruction tries to break through the finite constructions and closures of philosophical texts in order to open them for alternative views, to prepare a place for innovative approaches, as an ‘invention of the other’.​[19]​
	In his interpretations of philosophical texts, therefore, Derrida always emphasizes the metaphysical presuppositions that are at work in the text, he stresses them in order to criticize the main lines of thought within the text and to open them for the alterity that they had excluded or suppressed. In his opinion Heidegger’s thought is still metaphysical by focusing entirely on ontological difference as the one difference that philosophy is concerned with.​[20]​ Comparably, in Levinas’ work Derrida finds a reduction of all philosophical questions to the sole source of meaning, i.e. ethical difference.​[21]​ Even these philosophies of difference, despite their critique of the metaphysical tradition, still contain metaphysical elements of thought.


2. From metaphysics to language

A different approach of the metaphysical tradition can be found in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas. They do not regard metaphysics as a certain manner of thinking that is inherent in philosophy, but as a historical period that has been left behind for already quite some time. For them metaphysics means the search for an ultimate ground and understanding of reality as a whole – an approach that is outdated by the investigation of historical and linguistic structures in which philosophical thought is always already embedded.  

Gadamer
Thinking in the line of Heidegger’s ontological turn in the hermeneutic tradition, Gadamer takes all interpretation as a work of dialogue, e.g. a dialogue between text and reader in which their horizons fuse. In his relation to the metaphysical tradition Gadamer takes a different stand than his teacher Heidegger. Heidegger wanted to overcome metaphysics through the elaboration of the help of a new thinking – an effort of which he knew that it was an infinite task, because philosophy inevitably again and again falls back in the ‘language of metaphysics’. According to Gadamer, however, this idea of a ‘language of metaphysics’ is a poor and inexact expression; “there is no language of metaphysics”.​[22]​ During the history of philosophy a philosophical terminology has been developed that can be traced by a conceptual history that tries to find back the ‘living language’, the full and original meaning of words before they changed into fixed metaphysical concepts. This is, according to Gadamer, the only possible meaning of a ‘language of metaphysics’: the edification of a philosophical conceptuality with all its implications, that can be criticized with the help of a conceptual history.​[23]​ 
	For Gadamer, metaphysics has already been surpassed in his own view of language as dialogue: the endless effort to reach understanding and agreement that in no way aims at an absolute and definitive comprehension of the whole of reality.​[24]​ This idea of dialogue emphasizes the linguistic and historical limits of all understanding and thereby claims to have gone by the metaphysical tradition.
	Obviously, another concept of metaphysics is at stake here: it is not the necessarily violent objectification that makes thought metaphysical, but the effort to reach absolute knowledge of an all encompassing principle – an effort that we, according to Gadamer, already have left behind at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Habermas
Jürgen Habermas even goes further by maintaining that contemporary philosophy finds itself in the same position as the generation after Hegel: “since then we have no alternative for post-metaphysical thought.”​[25]​ With ‘great simplification’, Habermas defines metaphysics as the idealism of Plato through Hegel.​[26]​ He discerns within this line of thought three main aspects: the ‘motive of unity’ that looks for the one origin, the identity of being and thought, and a ‘strong concept of theory’ that places itself above common sense and praxis. In modern philosophy the turn to subjectivity has changed these aspects of objective idealism into a ‘philosophy of consciousness’.​[27]​ 
	Several developments in 19th century thought have deprived philosophy of its founding abilities and have also made it possible to combine unity or community and individuality without metaphysical paradoxes and aporias. The task of philosophy has changed from founding scientific knowledge to that of mediating between the sciences and the lifeworld. Absolute reason has been traded here for communicative reason, the rationality of language and dialogue, the presuppositions of which Habermas has reconstructed in his theory of communicative action.​[28]​ 





Both currents of thought that I have sketched above, can cast accusations of being ‘metaphysical’ against each other, “…as if that were a deadly weapon”.​[30]​ On the one hand, Derrida’s deconstructive strategies can lay bare the metaphysical assumptions that are inherent in projects of Habermas and Gadamer. Even if they are accepted as assumptions and not as ‘strong concepts’, they have a metaphysical function with all the accompanying features like hierarchical oppositions, fixed definitions and distinctions as well as suppression and exclusion of alterity. Although Habermas and Gadamer claim that their historical hermeneutical thought has done away with absolute metaphysical pretensions, the contextually situated and historical suppositions they adhere to, can always be stretched to their absolute limits. This is the point where I think Derrida is right: a revisiting of the old metaphysical tradition is inevitable and brings along a prospect for critical evaluation. 
	But here we reach, on the other hand, a point of critique that is put forward by Gadamer and Habermas against Derrida. By changing every issue into a metaphysical problem, Derrida, according to his opponents, loses the ability to positively acknowledge the possibility of understanding, agreement and practical employability of thought. His ‘negative metaphysics’ can only have negative and critical effects; he dismantles but does not construct. 
	It has to be admitted here that Derrida does not deny the possibility of new ethical, political and scientific initiatives. On the contrary, he encourages them. But his own work is more focused on the transcendental conditions of possibility and impossibility that undermine and problematize any new initiative as well. Therefore, his philosophy remains at least suspect of being an unusable and negative metaphysics. A more practical use of deconstructive interventions is very well possible, but also demands a free and distant attitude towards Derrida’s own work. This is the point where I think Gadamer and Habermas are right. ​[31]​
	In general, we can say, on the one hand, against Habermas and Gadamer, that metaphysical questions can never be left behind. They are still relevant with regard to the basic ontological assumptions that are inherent in contextually situated and historical suppositions, even if they have abandoned their absolute pretensions. On the other hand, against Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida, one can have reservations with regard to the metaphysical desire that still haunts their work in, respectively, the question of Being, the subjection to the other and the invention of the other. In short, all critiques of metaphysics emphasize one feature of the metaphysical tradition they abandon and at the same time engage in another feature. 
	The ‘postmodernism-debate’ seems to have been caught in this dilemma: either one denies the undeniable metaphysical side of all thinking, or one takes this metaphysical side as the core of all philosophy, thereby falling back into a negative metaphysics. 


4. Patočka’s Negative Platonism

It is time now to take a look at Patočka’s Negative Platonism to see if it is able to overcome this dilemma. In answering the question ‘which metaphysics has died?’ (175)​[32]​, Patočka goes back to the birth of metaphysics. He even goes further back, to the birth of philosophy. The moment of this last birth he finds in Socrates, “the great questioner” and “symbol of philosophy as such” (180). In his “absolute freedom”, in the movement of “constantly freeing himself”, “…Socrates unveils one of the fundamental contradictions of being human, that between the relation to the whole, intrinsic to humans, and the inability, the impossibility of expressing this relation in the form of an ordinary finite knowledge” (180). Socrates thus formulates “a new truth”, the truth of philosophy as such, that can be only articulated “…in the form of a question, in the form of a skeptical analysis, of a negation of all finite assertions” (181). 
	The essence of metaphysics, as Patočka finds it in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus, consists in offering an answer to the Socratic questions (181). Plato’s answer finds its shape in the doctrine of Ideas: a static system of rigid and lifeless principles that takes the place of the “living force of transcendence” and “the living reality of Socrates’ struggle against the degeneration of life” (182). But there is also the other side of the Platonic Idea: it is “…also a goal and a model that confronts us – that is a Socratic element” (181). These two moments are kept in mind by Patočka whenever he writes in this text of Ideas. The main side of the Ideas, for Patočka, is not formed by the concepts and their systematic order, but by their separation from our everyday experience and actual reality, that is, by the chorismos (198). 
	Chorismos is not the separation of two realms of objects, but it separates objectivity from that which can not anymore be articulated in terms of objects. The chorismos shows that there is more than just the empirically given. Human existence also relates to the world as a whole. Patočka reinterprets the Platonic notion of Idea by emphasizing the element of chorismos. He thus gives a “non-metaphysical” (197) reading of Plato’s Ideas, changing them into what happens to be the core of his Socratic view of philosophy. The Idea – Patočka prefers to speak of it in the singular form – cannot be defined in a positive and objective manner; it cannot be seen. “Rather, the Idea enables us to see in a ‘spiritual’ sense in which we can say that we see something more than is contained in the given, in what is presented. It is what makes it possible for us to see more than we observe” (199). Patočka strips the Idea of its presentational objective character in order to show its transcendental quality: the Idea is “…the origin and wellspring of all human objectification” (199). 
	In other words: we have the freedom to choose new perspectives at the phenomena that are given to us. Freedom is described here by Patočka as the ability to look beyond the empirically given, to have an understanding of ‘the whole’. The experience of freedom is an experience of transcendence (193). The Idea, in Patočka’s sense, is “…the pure supra-objective call of transcendence” (204). This re-interpretation of the Platonic Idea is presented by Patočka as an effort to “transcend and preserve (aufheben) metaphysics in a deeper sense” (197), in other words, as a step from metaphysics to philosophy, from Plato back to Socrates. 
	But since that which is beyond the chorismos cannot be positively articulated, Negative Platonism can never completely take the step from metaphysics back to philosophy. It is essentially marked by a tension between on the one hand the freedom and openness towards the world as a whole and on the other hand the necessity to give a positive expression of the beyond. 
	This tension has left its traces in Patočka’s style in this essay. At several passages Patočka clearly states that metaphysics has come to an end (175), while Negative Platonism is described as a “philosophy purified of metaphysical claims” (205). But he also states that “…the human spirit returns to metaphysics ever again, in spite of its putative emptiness and invalidity…” (197) and he remarks that Negative Platonism “…shows how much truth there is in man’s perennial metaphysical struggle for something elevated above the natural and the traditional […], in the struggle, taken up ever again, against a relativism of values and norms” (205-206). It seems that metaphysics as a set of positively formulated claims has died, but that it lives on in a negative way, as a truth without objectivity, which, however, also has positive traits, as a struggle against relativism. This can also be found in the balanced end of Patočka’s text, where he describes Negative Platonism as both poor and rich: poor because it “…can make no assertions of positive content about the Idea or about man” (205); rich, because it guards philosophy’s ‘own-most domain’ and it “…preserves for humans the possibility of trusting in a truth that is not relative and mundane, even though it cannot be formulated positively, in terms of content” (205). This last quotation clearly shows the tension of Negative Platonism at work: what is a truth that is not relative, but can also not be formulated positively? 
	In this text, written in 1953, Patočka leaves this question unanswered. In another essay, written in about the same period, he speaks of a ‘regulative transcendence’ that combines the receptivity for the call of transcendence with the impossibility of a positive answer.​[33]​ In his later work Patočka has developed out of this tension the idea of the care for the soul. The same struggle against both absolutism and relativism then calls for an existential stability that is able to question itself as well.​[34]​
	The tension of the positive and the negative, to which Patočka refers again and again, as well as a slight emphasis on the negative side, can be found in the terminology and title of the essay. Why not something like ‘Positive Socratism’ instead of ‘Negative Platonism’? And why did Patočka hold on to the notion of ‘Idea’, where he in fact means chorismos? These seem to be signs of a work in progress that is still looking for a more positive way to articulate itself. 


5. The Relevance of ‘Negative Platonism’

In this tension Patočka also takes together the two concepts of metaphysics that I discerned in the first part of this article. On the one hand he seems to agree with Gadamer and Habermas that metaphysics has already ended a long time ago. The opening phrases of ‘Negative Platonism’ mention the awareness of the end of metaphysics as something the 19th and the 20th century have in common (175, cf. 188). On the other hand he claims, with Heidegger, that no one really knows what this means, because “…the question has yet to be posed adequately.” (175). And, with Derrida and others, he speaks of the “perennial metaphysical struggle” (197, 205), as an answer to “the call of transcendence” (204). 
	From the perspective of Patočka’s Negative Platonism Gadamer and Habermas seem to have missed the urge of the call of transcendence. Dialogical philosophy can find its foundations neither in the rules or practices of language nor in what Gadamer calls the ‘verbum interius’, the inner speech that can never be entirely expressed in language.​[35]​ Both philosophers have ignored the chorismos that is still at work after the end of metaphysics. 
	Although Patočka places his own Negative Platonism in line with Heidegger’s overcoming of metaphysics (188), his portrayal of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as “…entering a mystical depth where thought fuses with the ground of being,” (187), does not seem to be the sort of description that Patočka would have liked to hear for his own thoughts. Both Heidegger and Levinas have given too much of an answer to the metaphysical questions, whether it is in the thinking of Being or in the recognition of the retreating and commanding face of the other. From the perspective of Negative Platonism all these philosophers, each in their own way, change the tension of post-metaphysical thought into a dilemma, positing itself one-sidedly on one of the poles. 
	Either metaphysics has been taken as an outdated effort to look for absolutes, while philosophy is supposed to positively formulate finite answers to finite questions. Or metaphysics has been seen as an inescapable unifying way of thinking that can only be undertaken in a negative form.
	However, Patočka seems to be very close here to Derrida. The relation of Negative Platonism to Derrida’s ‘community of the question’ needs a more detailed discussion. Let us start with what they have in common. Despite a different terminology both agree that metaphysical questions with regard to the totality of reality and to absolute values and presuppositions keep haunting us and will never be satisfactorily answered. This is what Derrida means with the ‘community of the question’, where basic questions worry philosophy, that has to maintain the question as a question.​[36]​ The fact that the questions cannot be answered is demonstrated by the plurality of answers.​[37]​ Derrida prefers to speak here of the ‘openness for the other’ and for the unpredictable ‘event’. Patočka rather speaks of freedom and transcendence. Both approaches underline the necessary possibility (in terms of both description and prescription) of new and unexpected views and ideas. 
	In addition, this does not mean that any answer would be good, that receptivity for the event would mean receptivity for everything. In other words, it does not lead to relativism. On the contrary, the call of the other (Derrida) or of transcendence (Patočka) is a call for truth.​[38]​ Openness does not mean relativity but perfectibility of metaphysical answers to the questions we are faced with.
	Nevertheless the attitude of Patočka and Derrida towards the actually given metaphysical answers is not entirely the same. Derrida admits that we cannot do without answers, but he emphasizes the need of a critical approach of all the answers the metaphysical tradition has given, especially their totalizing tendency that is inherent in all hierarchal oppositions, i.e. in all language. In his later work the openness for the other is slightly changed into openness for the absolute other. His formula ‘tout autre est tout autre’, ‘every other is wholly other’, calls for an abstraction from every concretely given phenomenon to the abstract other and singular as such. This strategy can be recognized in his work on, e.g., justice, the messianic and negative theology.​[39]​ This direction to the absolute other goes hand in hand with the excavation of every positive articulation of a fundamental idea. The emphasis on absolute alterity and the excavation of metaphysical positions reveals an urge for purity that can be interpreted as a trace of the metaphysical desire for the absolute. Absolute purity still functions here as a norm that can never be fulfilled. Therefore, Derrida’s oscillation between the metaphysical intention of absolute knowledge and the finite constructions of the metaphysical tradition can in itself be taken as a metaphysical construction; his plea for the messianic without messianism is in itself a messianism. The metaphysical desire is still at work in Derrida’s texts, be it in a negative way. It is not the case that Derrida himself would still be looking for definitive metaphysical answers, but he seems to believe that philosophy as such is characterized by this metaphysical urge. In other words, we necessarily have to think something absolute, and then Derrida will be eager to deconstruct it. 
	In Patočka this metaphysical desire cannot be found. He is not looking for an excavation of all metaphysical projects. In his texts there is also no orientation towards an absolute other. 

Therefore, whereas in Derrida a tendency can be found toward a negative metaphysics that is getting closer to Levinas; in the work of Patočka one can see a movement to a more positive articulation of the metaphysical quest for meaning. Although Patočka’s style and terminology seem to stress the negative side of his relation to the metaphysical tradition, there is a positive side as well, expressed in terms of freedom and of a struggle against relativism. Like Derrida, Patočka underlines the infinite recurrence of metaphysical questions and the plurality of answers, but, contrary to Derrida, he does not take the metaphysical desire for purity for granted. This leaves space for a more positive approach of a Socratic questioning philosophy that in his later work has been developed into the notion of the ‘care for the soul’. The care for the soul does not only mean that the soul must constantly question itself or that it must be receptive for being questioned. It also means the concern to find a new equilibrium after being shaken, a new harmony, in human life as well as in the polis: “To get firm ground under our feet again!”​[40]​ 
	In his later work Plato and Europe, Patočka is looking for a more positive account of the search for meaning: “Our cognizing about whether we are within good or within evil, truth or untruth is never completed. The question is whether this existence in this alternative, in this indecisiveness […] whether this does not have an essential meaning that is not negative, but rather positive.”​[41]​ It is exactly this search for a stable and positive meaning beyond metaphysics that shows us the relevance of Negative Platonism. Instead of, on the one hand, a neglecting of the call of transcendence and instead of, on the other hand, a falling back into a negative metaphysics, Patočka shows us the meaning of metaphysical questions, of our being metaphysically questioned, for our human existence. This affirmative existentialist meaning of the care for the soul gives Patočka’s relation to the metaphysical tradition its particular stand and also its contemporary relevance. 
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